Why Iloilo City Escaped Severe Flooding During Typhoon Tino: The Story Behind the Flood Control Success

When Typhoon Tino (international name: Kalmaegi) devastated Central Visayas in early November 2025, leaving over 224 dead—most of them in Cebu—Iloilo City told a strikingly different story. Despite the typhoon making its fifth landfall directly in Iloilo City on November 4, 2025, and bringing torrential rains exceeding 200 millimeters, the city recorded zero casualties and only four barangays experienced flooding. Meanwhile, neighboring Cebu faced what its governor called “the worst flash flood caused by a typhoon” in the province’s history.

The stark contrast has prompted many Ilonggos to credit the city’s flood control infrastructure—particularly the Jaro Floodway and related projects—for saving lives and property. But how much of this praise is deserved? What’s the real story behind Iloilo’s flood control system?

The Iloilo Flood Control Project: A Two-Decade Journey

The Problem: A City Built on Flood Plains

Iloilo City’s geography has always made it vulnerable to flooding. Located on extensive plains with an average elevation of just 3 meters above sea level, the city sits at the confluence of several rivers—the Iloilo River, Jaro River, Tigum River, and Aganan River—that drain into the Iloilo Strait. This low-lying terrain, combined with the Philippines’ location in the typhoon belt, created a recipe for annual flooding disasters.

The wake-up call came in July 1994, when torrential rains inundated almost the entire city, flooding approximately 25,000 homes. Between 1998 and 2001 alone, 119,028 households were affected by floods six times. The economic impact was staggering—in 1999, natural disaster damage in the Philippines totaled 11,381 million pesos, about 0.4% of the country’s gross national product at the time.

The Solution: Japanese-Funded Infrastructure

Recognizing flood control as critical to Iloilo City’s development as the economic hub of Western Visayas, the Philippine government partnered with Japan to launch the Iloilo Flood Control Project (IFCP). Financed by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), later transitioning to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the project was implemented by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in two phases from 1999 to 2011.

The project’s scope was comprehensive:

Major Components:

Jaro Floodway Construction: A 4.75-kilometer artificial waterway designed to divert floodwaters from where the Tigum and Aganan Rivers meet, channeling them directly to the Iloilo Strait instead of through the narrow Jaro River
Iloilo River Improvement: 4.2 kilometers of river channel enhancement
Jaro River Improvement: 5.85 kilometers of river channel work
Additional Infrastructure: Diversion channels, flood retarding basins, sabo dams, and watershed management measures
Resettlement Program: 505 households were relocated from high-risk areas, with 83.7 hectares of land acquired

Construction Partners:

Phase 1: China International Water & Electric Corp.
Phase 2: Hanjin Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. (Korea)
Construction Supervision: CTI Engineering International Co., Ltd. (Japan)

The project’s total cost exceeded several billion pesos, representing one of the largest flood mitigation investments in the Visayas region.

How It Works: Engineering Excellence

The centerpiece of the system is the Jaro Floodway, which functions as a pressure relief valve for Iloilo City’s river system. During heavy rainfall, instead of allowing floodwaters from the Tigum and Aganan Rivers to flow into the already-stressed Jaro River, the floodway intercepts this water and channels it directly to the Iloilo Strait.

This simple but effective design prevents the dangerous convergence of multiple river flows that previously overwhelmed the city’s drainage capacity. The floodway includes:

Six bridges allowing cross-traffic
Parallel service roads on both sides
Vetiver grass and concrete reinforcements along river walls
Connection points to the existing river system

Interestingly, the project created an unexpected environmental benefit. Since the floodway’s completion in 2011, increased sedimentation at its mouth has expanded the shoreline by 1.4 kilometers, creating new intertidal zones where mangrove forests have naturally regrown at a rate of 4.3 hectares per year from 2010 to 2018.

Typhoon Tino: The Ultimate Test

By the Numbers

When Typhoon Tino struck in early November 2025, Iloilo City faced conditions that would have been catastrophic before the flood control project:

Typhoon Intensity:

Made landfall in Iloilo City at 1:20 PM on November 4, 2025
Maximum sustained winds: 130 kph
Wind gusts: Up to 180 kph
Rainfall: Torrential rains exceeding 200 millimeters within 24 hours
Signal No. 4 raised over the city

Iloilo City’s Response and Results:

27 barangays under mandatory preemptive evacuation
121 barangays affected (out of 180 total)
5,231 families or 18,216 individuals affected
Zero casualties
Only 4 barangays experienced flooding
1,692 houses damaged (mostly from wind, not water)
Main impacts: 195 uprooted trees and 28 fallen utility posts

The Cebu Contrast:

At least 158 deaths in Cebu alone
Entire barangays wiped out by flash floods
Floodwaters reached second-floor levels in many areas
The Mananga River overflow destroyed entire settlements
Half of Barangay Bacayan flooded—first time in 35 years
State of calamity declared

Why the Difference?

Several factors explain Iloilo City’s relative success:

1. Functional Flood Infrastructure The Jaro Floodway and improved river channels performed exactly as designed, efficiently diverting massive volumes of water away from populated areas. The system prevented the dangerous convergence of river flows that caused catastrophic flooding in Cebu.

2. Effective Disaster Preparedness Mayor Raisa Treñas issued Executive Order No. 121, mandating preemptive evacuations in high-risk areas before the typhoon hit. The City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council activated 170 evacuation centers and coordinated a comprehensive response involving all emergency services.

3. Early Warning Systems The province’s DRRM office maintained round-the-clock monitoring and coordination with PAGASA, allowing for timely warnings and responses. As PDRRM officer Cornelio Salinas stated, “Our target is zero casualties. All this is a shared responsibility, not just of the government.”

4. Geographic Advantages While Iloilo City did experience Typhoon Tino’s full force, the storm had already made several landfalls (in Southern Leyte, Cebu, Negros Occidental, and Guimaras) before reaching Iloilo, slightly weakening its intensity. Additionally, Cebu’s mountainous terrain may have contributed to more severe flash flooding from rapid runoff.

The Controversial Side: Not All Projects Are Equal

While the original JICA-funded Iloilo Flood Control Project has proven effective, the story of more recent flood mitigation efforts in the city is far more contentious.

The Discaya Controversy

In August 2025, Mayor Raisa Treñas revealed that nearly ₱4 billion worth of flood control projects in Iloilo City were either poorly constructed, unfinished, or could not be located. These projects, funded under the 2024 and 2025 General Appropriations Acts and implemented by the DPWH’s Iloilo City District Engineering Office, became part of a national scandal.

Key Issues:

At least 5 of 17 flood mitigation structures were deemed “non-existent” or could not be located
Two companies—Alpha and Omega General Contractor & Development Corporation and St. Timothy Construction—were among 15 firms nationwide identified by President Marcos Jr. as having cornered 20% of flood control funds
Multiple Discaya family-owned firms (St. Timothy, St. Gerrard, St. Matthew, Alpha and Omega) were implementing projects with incomplete documentation
Some transparency boards lacked basic information like contract IDs, start dates, or completion dates
Projects showed conflicting contractor records and discrepancies between on-site information and official DPWH records

Budget Priorities Questioned

A September 2025 analysis revealed that from 2019 to 2024, Iloilo City spent ₱7 billion on infrastructure projects, but only 5.4% (₱378 million) was invested in drainage and flood control—despite the Local Government Code identifying these as basic services that LGUs must provide.

Pending Projects and Delays

According to DPWH sources, 21 flood control projects worth more than ₱2.7 billion are currently underway in Iloilo City, but many face significant delays due to:

Red tape and bureaucratic processes
Informal settlers blocking construction sites
Overlapping government responsibilities
Projects requiring regional office approval being split into multiple smaller contracts
Pending utility relocations (e.g., waterline transfers)

Examples of Ongoing Projects:

Improvement of the Jaro Floodway and Related Drainage Systems – 98% complete
Rehabilitation of the Dungon Creek Flood Control Structure – 90% complete
Expansion of the La Paz Drainage Network – 60% complete
Upgrading of the Calajunan–Molo River Flood Protection Works – 35% complete

In September 2025, President Marcos visited Iloilo to personally inspect flood control projects and ordered DPWH and LGUs to “ensure durable, reliable, and appropriate flood control projects” while holding accountable “negligent and corrupt individuals.”

Future Plans: Building on Success

2026 and Beyond

Despite the controversies, Iloilo City is committed to strengthening its flood resilience. In November 2025, the city government announced a ₱250 million allocation for drainage and disaster mitigation projects in 2026—a significant increase signaling a renewed focus on flood control.

Funding Sources:

₱181 million from the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Fund
₱41.2 million from the General Fund
₱13 million from the PAGCOR Trust Fund
₱19 million from the 2025 Supplemental Budget (to be implemented in 2026)

Mayor Treñas emphasized: “We are investing in sustainable, long-term solutions that safeguard our communities and make Iloilo City more resilient to the effects of climate change.”

The Phase 2 Question

City officials have long sought funding for Phase 2 of the original Iloilo Flood Control Project, which would address flooding in areas not covered by Phase 1—particularly Mandurriao district and other portions of the city. While Phase 2 was recommended in JICA’s original plans and a feasibility study (Metro Iloilo Urban Drainage Improvement and Related Works Project) was completed by DPWH in 2017, funding has not yet been secured.

Emerging Challenges

New threats to Iloilo City’s flood resilience have emerged:

1. Land Subsidence In August 2024, the University of the Philippines Resilience Institute reported that Iloilo City is sinking at a rate of 9 millimeters per year. While city officials downplayed the finding as “the lowest” compared to other areas, subsidence compounds flooding risks by reducing relative elevation above sea level.

2. Climate Change Typhoons are becoming more intense and unpredictable. Tino brought rainfall that exceeded design parameters, and future storms may prove even more challenging.

3. Rapid Urbanization Increased development reduces permeable surfaces, increases runoff, and strains existing drainage systems. Some barangay officials have cited uphill developments as hampering “mother nature’s way of functioning naturally.”

4. Maintenance and Sustainability The original flood control infrastructure is now over a decade old. Ensuring proper maintenance, addressing sedimentation issues, and upgrading systems to meet current needs requires sustained investment and attention.

Lessons from Typhoon Tino

What Worked

Infrastructure Matters: The stark contrast between Iloilo City’s zero casualties and Cebu’s massive death toll demonstrates that properly designed, well-constructed flood control infrastructure saves lives. The original JICA-funded project proved its worth when it mattered most.

Preparedness Saves Lives: Even with good infrastructure, proactive disaster management—including preemptive evacuations, early warnings, and coordinated emergency response—is essential. Mayor Treñas’ decisive evacuation order likely prevented casualties even in areas that did experience flooding.

Long-term Investment Pays Off: The IFCP took over a decade to complete and cost billions of pesos, but that investment protected the city when Typhoon Tino struck. Short-term thinking cannot address structural vulnerability to natural disasters.

What Needs Improvement

Transparency and Accountability: The issues with recent flood control projects highlight the need for better oversight, clearer documentation, and accountability in government contracting. Quality matters as much as quantity.

Comprehensive Coverage: While the Jaro Floodway effectively protects the areas it serves, other parts of Iloilo City remain vulnerable. The drainage system needs continued improvement and expansion.

Coordination Between Agencies: The city government’s frustration with DPWH’s project implementation points to the need for better coordination between national and local agencies. As local officials noted, proper coordination could prevent many of the delays and confusion that have plagued recent projects.

Sustained Commitment: The relatively low percentage of city budget devoted to flood control from 2019-2024 (5.4%) suggests that flood mitigation hasn’t always been the top priority, despite its critical importance. The 2026 budget increase is encouraging, but sustained commitment is necessary.

The Verdict: Credit Where It's Due

So, when Ilonggos give credit to the flood control project for Iloilo City’s relative escape from Typhoon Tino’s worst impacts, are they right?

Yes—with important caveats.

The original Iloilo Flood Control Project (1999-2011), particularly the Jaro Floodway, demonstrably worked as designed. When Typhoon Tino brought conditions that would have caused catastrophic flooding two decades ago, the infrastructure successfully diverted massive volumes of water away from populated areas. The zero casualties and minimal flooding in most of the city stand in stark contrast to the devastation seen in neighboring areas.

However, this success story comes with important qualifications:

Not all flood projects are equal: Recent controversies reveal that not all money spent on “flood control” translates to effective infrastructure. Quality, transparency, and proper implementation matter enormously.
Success requires more than infrastructure: Effective disaster preparedness, early warning systems, and coordinated emergency response were also critical to Iloilo City’s achievement of zero casualties.
The job isn’t finished: Parts of the city remain vulnerable, maintenance is ongoing, and new challenges like climate change and land subsidence require continued investment and adaptation.
Geography played a role: Iloilo City’s location and the typhoon’s track also influenced outcomes. The infrastructure worked, but it wasn’t tested under the absolute worst-case scenario.

A Model for Resilience

Typhoon Tino provided a real-world test of Iloilo City’s flood control infrastructure under severe conditions. The results validate the wisdom of the original JICA-funded investment and offer important lessons for other Philippine cities facing similar flood risks.

The contrast between Iloilo and Cebu during Typhoon Tino underscores a fundamental truth: when it comes to natural disasters, infrastructure investment and effective governance can mean the difference between tragedy and survival. As climate change brings more intense weather events, Iloilo’s experience—both its successes and its ongoing challenges—provides a valuable case study in urban flood resilience.

For Ilonggos, the lesson is clear: the flood control project works, but maintaining and expanding that protection requires continued vigilance, investment, and accountability. The infrastructure that saved lives during Typhoon Tino must be protected, properly maintained, and extended to cover all vulnerable areas.

The city’s commitment to doubling down on flood control with a ₱250 million allocation for 2026 suggests that local leaders understand what’s at stake. As Mayor Treñas stated, “We are investing in sustainable, long-term solutions that safeguard our communities and make Iloilo City more resilient to the effects of climate change.”

In a world of increasingly extreme weather, that may be the most important investment any city can make.

Sources: Department of Public Works and Highways, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Iloilo City Government, Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration, National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, Panay News, Philippine Information Agency, Rappler, Philippine Daily Inquirer, GMA Network, CTI Engineering International

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